BPDS: A Blockchain based Privacy-Preserving Data Sharing for Electronic
  Medical Records by Liu, Jingwei et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
81
1.
03
22
3v
1 
 [c
s.C
R]
  8
 N
ov
 20
18
BPDS: A Blockchain based Privacy-Preserving Data
Sharing for Electronic Medical Records
Jingwei Liu∗, Xiaolu Li∗, Lin Ye†, Hongli Zhang†, Xiaojiang Du‡, and Mohsen Guizani§
∗State Key Lab of ISN, Xidian University, Xi’an, 710071, China.
Email: jwliu@mail.xidian.edu.cn, lixiaolu0318@163.com
†School of Computer Science and Engineering, Harbin Institute of Technology, Harbin, 150001, China.
Email: hityelin@hit.edu.cn, zhanghongli@hit.edu.cn
‡Department of Computer and Information Sciences, Temple University, Philadelphia, PA 19122, USA.
Email: dxj@ieee.org
§Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, University of ldaho, Mosocow, ldaho, USA.
Email: mguizani@ieee.org
Abstract—Electronic medical record (EMR) is a crucial form
of healthcare data, currently drawing a lot of attention. Sharing
health data is considered to be a critical approach to improve
the quality of healthcare service and reduce medical costs.
However, EMRs are fragmented across decentralized hospitals,
which hinders data sharing and puts patients’ privacy at risks.
To address these issues, we propose a blockchain based privacy-
preserving data sharing for EMRs, called BPDS. In BPDS, the
original EMRs are stored securely in the cloud and the indexes
are reserved in a tamper-proof consortium blockchain. By this
means, the risk of the medical data leakage could be greatly
reduced, and at the same time, the indexes in blockchain ensure
that the EMRs can not be modified arbitrarily. Secure data
sharing can be accomplished automatically according to the
predefined access permissions of patients through the smart
contracts of blockchain. Besides, the joint-design of the CP-
ABE-based access control mechanism and the content extraction
signature scheme provides strong privacy preservation in data
sharing. Security analysis shows that BPDS is a secure and
effective way to realize data sharing for EMRs.
I. INTRODUCTION
Electronic medical records (EMRs) are often highly sensi-
tive private information for clinical diagnosis and treatment
in healthcare. EMRs sharing is considered to be a promising
approach to improve the quality of healthcare services, ac-
celerate biomedical discoveries, and reduce medical costs [1],
[2]. However, most of private clinics and institutions usually
use internal network to keep track of their patients but don’t
implement data sharing with other healthcare institutions,
which leads to the difficulty and expense of medical service
and the phenomenon of information island. To handle these
issues of existing healthcare system, a secure data sharing
infrastructure is necessary to be constructed.
However, in healthcare domain, three factors are particu-
larly important: privacy, security, and interoperability. First,
EMRs often have high privacy-sensitive, thus the leakage of
these data could hurt patients’ reputation and finances. Sec-
ond, the existing healthcare systems are based on a centralized
architecture, which has security and robustness vulnerabili-
ties such as single-point-of-failure and arbitrary modification
attacks. Moreover, the interoperability between healthcare
institutions still remains a severe challenge. Fortunately, an
emerging technology named blockchain provides a brand-new
approach to solve these issues with decentralized architecture.
Blockchain technology is the underlying technology of
Bitcoin [3] that invented by mysterious Satoshi Nakamoto
in 2008. Due to the attractive features, such as transpar-
ent, anonymous, autonomous, and tamper-proof, blockchain
technology has been widely used in voting, supply chain,
healthcare, IoT, and other applications [4]. In the blockchain,
all transactions are validated through consensus mechanism in
the untrusted environment and no participants can modify the
data arbitrarily. Blockchain is implemented in a decentralized
network of computing nodes, which makes it robust against
failures and attacks. Moreover, blockchain together with the
smart contracts can enhance the interoperability of health data.
Therefore, blockchain has a strong potential application in
healthcare [5]. Aiming at data security and patients’ privacy
issues in healthcare, we adopt consortium blockchain that
is managed by several preselected medical institutions to
construct a secure EMRs sharing system, because, compared
with public blockchain, it can control user nodes in or out of
the network through flexible access mechanisms with better
privacy preservation. Besides, it has advantages of lower cost,
higher performance and scalability.
So far, there have been lots of studies on the security
and privacy issues in different application scenarios [6]–[12].
Recently, many companies and research institutions, such as
Philips, Gem Health, Google, and IBM are actively exploring
the medical applications based on blockchain technology.
We summarize some research efforts in healthcare [13]–[16]
as follows. Yue et al. proposed a healthcare data gateway
(HDG) based on the blockchain storage platform, which
allows patients to process their own data without violating
privacy [13]. In [14], Azaria et al. presented a decentralized
record management system, called MedRec, which can han-
dle EMRs using blockchain technology. In [15], Guo et al.
proposed an attribute-based signature scheme with multiple
authorities. However, most studies only considered privacy
preservation for access control mechanisms instead of the
sensitive data itself. In fact, protecting data privacy from the
perspective of data itself is simpler and more effective than
the access control mechanism.
In certain scenarios, the sensitive information (eg. patients’
name or ID number) in EMRs do not need to provide
for further analysis and research. So we creatively adopt
the content extraction signature (CES) to protect patients’
privacy in terms of data itself, rather than just depending on
access control mechanisms. CES allows patients to selectively
share the signed medical data that can be verified by any
others. In this paper, we propose a blockchain based privacy-
preserving data sharing for EMRs, named BPDS. In BPDS,
the original EMRs are stored in cloud and only the indexes are
reserved in a tamper-proof blockchain. We design an improved
delegated proof of stake consensus to provide the suitable and
reasonable transaction verification. Secure data sharing can be
accomplished through the smart contracts in blockchain. By
implementing the proposed BPDS, patients can completely
control their own EMRs and users or medical institutions can
use data conveniently without leaking the patients’ privacy.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In
section II, we briefly introduce some preliminaries. In section
III, we describe system architecture and the implementation
of BPDS in detail. Section IV analyzes the security of BPDS.
Finally, we conclude the paper in section V.
II. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, some preliminaries used in our blockchain-
based data sharing scheme are introduced.
A. Blockchain
A blockchain is a type of distributed database or public
ledger in which validated transactions and digital events are
conserved and connected together chronologically in data
blocks [17], as shown in Fig. 1. The so-called data block is
composed of the data submitted by the transaction initiator
and the new records produced by the transaction verifier.
Moreover, each block is marked with a timestamp and the hash
of the previous block, which makes the data in blockchain
immutable and traceable. After reaching consensus by 51%
of the participants in the distributed network, valid blocks
will be added to the blockchain. Moreover, each node in this
distributed P2P network reserves the same copy of transaction
records, which provides the robustness against single-point-of-
failure and attacks. Therefore, blockchain has drawn a lot of
attention in various fields.
B. Improved DPoS
Delegated proof of stake (DPoS) is the backbone of Bit-
Shares. All nodes on the blockchain need to select 101
delegates. The selected 101 delegates are responsible for in
turn creating validate blocks as assigned. Compared to proof
of work (PoW) and proof of stake (PoS), DPoS is known
as faster, more decentralized and power-saving consensus
mechanism. In this paper, we use DPoS to reach consensus
for each transaction in the blockchain network.
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Fig. 1. A Chain of Blocks
However, the original election method of DPoS cannot
guarantee that the selected medical institutions are reliable.
Therefore, we improve its initialization manner and elect
nodes according to the rank of the medical institutions’ credit
scores. The top 30 institutions are designated as the repre-
sentative nodes (RPNs), in turn, to create blocks. The next
20 institutions are designated as the audit nodes (ATNs) to
audit these blocks. Any node that contributes to the healthcare
data sharing system will obtain the corresponding reward with
credit scores. If the RPN misses signing the assigned block
or the ATN makes a incorrect audit, their credit scores will
be reduced. Once the total scores fall below the threshold, this
node will be replaced by the other node with higher scores.
C. Smart Contracts
Smart contracts are event-driven computer programs run-
ning on the public ledger. It can handle and transfer assets of
considerable value. A famous application of smart contracts
is Ethereum that is an open source blockchain platform [18].
Specifically, smart contracts are some scripts or codes that
are deployed in blockchain. Once the predefined conditions
are activated, the scripts on the contract content could be
executed without the help of an external trusted authority. The
entire process is automated and the executed transactions are
recorded in the public ledge for auditing. The asset owner
has the right to revoke the access permissions to the user
who violates the contract. In the proposed BPDS, patients are
allowed to predefine access permissions, access actions (read,
write, or copy) and duration in the smart contracts to finely
control the data sharing of EMRs.
D. Content Extraction Signature
The content extraction signature (CES) first proposed by
Steinfeld et al. in [19] allows the users to remove sensitive
portions from the original signed message and regenerate valid
extraction signatures by themselves without extra interactions.
In addition, it has the merits of low communication overhead,
high efficiency and privacy preservation. So, different CES
schemes have been widely used in e-commerce, e-governance,
smart grid, healthcare and so on.
III. BPDS: BLOCKCHAIN BASED PRIVACY-PRESERVING
DATA SHARING FOR EMRS
In this section, we propose a privacy-preserving data shar-
ing based on blockchian, called BPDS.
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Fig. 2. System architecture of BPDS
A. System Architecture
BPDS is devised in a three-layer architecture, consisting of
data acquirement layer, data storage layer and data sharing
layer, as shown in Fig. 2. The function of each layer is
described as follows.
• Data Acquirement Layer. In this layer, EMRs are
created by data providers such as doctors. Doctors sign
patients’ EMRs using a CES scheme and send them
to the patients. Patients are the owners of EMRs and
can completely control them. In order to avoid privacy
information is leaked in the process of data sharing,
patients can remove sensitive information of EMRs and
generate valid extraction signatures.
• Data Storage Layer. The function of this layer is to
store the original EMRs and its indexes. Components of
data storage layer include:
– Cloud Storage. The cloud stores patients’ encrypted
EMRs and the extraction signature, meanwhile, out-
puts the storage location url and a timestamp. Data
access records also should be preserved to track the
malicious entity when data leakage takes place.
– Consortium Blockchain Network. We use consor-
tium blockchain to reserve indexes of EMRs and
achieve data sharing. The patient predefined access
permissions in the smart contracts to ensure data
sharing securely. Besides, each access request and
access activity should be recorded in the blockchain
network for future auditing or investigation.
• Data Sharing Layer. In this layer, the authorized pa-
tients, medical workers and healthcare institutions can
request patients’ EMRs and utilize them for making
personal health plans, getting better clinic treatment or
carrying out medical research.
TABLE I
NOTATIONS
Notations Description Notations Description
P Patient M/M ′ Medical data/the extracted subdata
D Doctor Indexi The indexes of EMRs
U Data user CEAS Content extraction access structure
RPN The representative node CI(M ′) The extraction subset
ATN The auditing node T A tag of CES
PK, SK D’s key pair for CES A Access Control Policy of CP-ABE
Kdoc D’s encryption key t A timestamp
pki, ski Key pairs of nodes H A hash function
B. Design Objectives
Because blockchain can manage medical data transparently
and securely, it has attracted a lot of attention in the healthcare.
The proposed BPDS aims to achieve secure storage and
sharing for EMRs through the joint-design of the consortium
blockchain, the cloud storage, and the context extraction
signature. Meanwhile, it provides the following privacy:
• Patients participate in the EMRs sharing transactions
voluntarily and anonymously;
• Patients and data users register unique and non-identity
accounts in the cloud database;
• The indexes of EMRs reserved in the consortium
blockchain cannot be changed by any opponents;
• Malicious entities can be tracked when data leakage is
detected;
• Patients can define (add/remove) who are allowed to
access medical data through smart contracts. Only the
authorized users can access the specified data.
C. Implementation of BPDS
In this section, we describe the workflow of the BPDS
system in detail. A patient (P ) goes to visit his/her doctor
(D) and the doctor (D) integrates related medical data as the
EMRs for the patient (P ). Upon receiving the EMRs, P stores
them to the cloud and submits the indexes of the EMRs to the
consortium blockchain with the list of authorized data users
(U). BPDS allows patients to manage their own EMRs as their
wish. Based on the blockchain, it achieves privacy-preserving
EMRs sharing through the following phases.
1) System Setup: To implement BPDS, users should reg-
ister unique accounts and create their keys at the first. Each
doctorD uses a pair of keys (PK,SK) to generate the content
extraction signature on EMRs for authentication.D also needs
a symmetric key Kdoc to encrypt EMRs for confidentiality. In
cloud storage, the cloud server publishes keys based on CP-
ABE for secure storage. All participants in the blockchain
have key pairs (pki, ski) to complete data sharing transactions.
The notations used in this paper are given in TABLE I.
2) Data Acquiring: In BPDS, we use the CES scheme
in [20] that can remove sensitive information from the original
message to protect P s’ privacy. D divides EMRs into seven
parts (Name, Gender, Age, ID number, medical history, phys-
ical examination or laboratory test, medical prescription) that
are denoted as M = {m1,m2,m3,m4,m5,m6,m7}. Then,
D defines the content extraction access structure CEAS =
{2, 3, 5} to prevent malicious extraction.D selects a CES-Tag
randomly with a fixed length of 80 bits, defined as T . The
process of CES is as follows:
- Key Generation (KG): The certification authority
chooses a a large prime p, a generator g in Zp, and
a hash function: H : {0, 1}∗ → Zp. Then, D selects a
random number a ∈ Z∗p and calculates v = g
a(mod p).
D publishes PK = {p, g, v} as the public key and keeps
SK = a as the private key.
- Signature Generation (SIG): After generating all the
keys, D signs the original medical data M by the
Algorithm 1 as follows.
Algorithm 1 SIG(SK,M,CEAS)
Input: D’s private key, SK = a; P ’s EMRs, M ; the content
extraction access structure, CEAS.
Output: The full signature result.
Select a random k ∈ Z∗p−1, compute r = g
k(mod p);
for each i ∈ [1, 7] do
hi ← H(Mi‖CEAS‖T ‖i);
end for
for each hi, i ∈ [1, 7] do
δi ← (hi − a · r) · k
−1mod(p− 1);
end for
return δFull ← (CEAS‖T ‖δ1‖δ2‖ · · · ‖δ7);
When the signature algorithm is completed, D encrypts
message (M‖hi(i∈[1,7])‖δFull‖CEAS‖T ) with Kdoc and en-
crypts his/her symmetric encryption key with P ’s public key
pkpat. Then, D sends both two encrypted information to P :
Info ={EKdoc(M‖hi(i∈[1,7])‖δFull‖CEAS‖T ),
Epkpat(Kdoc)}
(1)
3) Data Storing: After receiving the encrypted information
from D, P decrypts Kdoc and further obtains M . Next, P
verifies the correctness of the full signature δFull with two
steps:
- For each subdata Mi of data M , compute hi =
H(Mi‖CEAS‖T ‖i), where 1 ≤ i ≤ 7;
- Extract δi from the full signature δFull, verify v
r · rδi =
ghi(mod p) is hold or not, that is, vr · rδi = ga·r · rδi =
ga·r · gk·δi = ga·r+k·δi = ghi .
If the signature δFull is valid, perform the following step;
Otherwise, it returns failure.
Signature Extraction: P can extract the signature accord-
ing to CEAS and his/her wishes, as shown in Algorithm 2.
After generating the extraction signature, P encrypts the
extraction signature and the corresponding EMRs. Then, P
stores them in the cloud through CP-ABE based cryptographic
access control (CCAC) [21] as shown in Algorithm 3.
Thus, the original data stored in the cloud is:
Data = {Eki(Mi‖hi‖T ), E
′
A(ki), δExt} (2)
Algorithm 2 Ext(PK = {p, g, v},M,CEAS, δFull)
Input: D’s public key, PKdoc; P ’s EMRs, M ; the content
extraction access structure, CEAS; the full signature, δFull.
Output: The extraction signature result.
Construct extraction subset CI(M ′) based on CEAS and
generate subdata M ′ = {Mi | i ∈ CI(M
′)};
for each i ∈ CI(M ′) do
Extract δi from δFull;
end for
for each i, j ∈ CI(M ′) do
δi1 ← δ1, · · · , δij ← δj , where δij(j ∈ [1, f ]);
end for
return δExt ← (CEAS‖CI(M
′)‖T ‖δi1‖δi2‖ · · · ‖δif );
Algorithm 3 Data Storing Process in CCAC
Input: Data object, (Mi‖hi‖T ); The public parameters,
PK; The access control policy, A.
Output: Data storage location, urls.
1: Generate a random document key, ki;
2: Run the symmetric encryption algorithm E to en-
crypt (Mi‖hi‖T ) with ki and obtain the cipher-text
Eki(Mi‖hi‖T ), where i ∈ CI(M
′);
3: Run the encrypt algorithm E′ of CP-ABE to encrypt ki
with A and obtain the cipher-text E′A(ki);
4: Upload the triples {Eki(Mi‖hi‖T ), E
′
A(ki), δExt} to the
cloud storage and return the storage location urli;
4) Data Release: In this phase, P participates EMRs shar-
ing transactions voluntarily and anonymously. P signs the in-
dexes of EMRs and obtains the signature SIGskpat(Indexi).
Then, a transaction request (Req) is submitted to the consor-
tium blockchain, where i ∈ CI(M ′) and t is a timestamp:
Req ={Epkpat(Indexi)‖H(Indexi)‖
SIGskpat(Indexi)‖t}
(3)
Indexi = (urli‖hi‖t) (4)
After receiving the transaction request, the representative
node RPN is responsible for creating the assigned block. The
specific consensus process using improved DPoS is described
as follows:
• Step 1: RPN verifies each transaction and integrates
all valid data collected during the period into a data set
(expressed as Dset = {Req‖t}). The data set, RPN ’s
digital signature and the hash of the data set compose a
new data block. Then, RPN broadcasts the transaction
record (Rec) to the auditing nodes ATNs for approval:
RPN → ATNs : Rec ={Dset‖Dhash‖t‖
SIGskrpn(Dset‖Dhash)}
(5)
Dhash = H(Dset‖t) (6)
• Step 2: ATNs verify the validity of the data block and
return a reply (Rep) to RPN that contains its audit result
(Res) and signature:
ATNs→ RPN : Rep =Epkrpn{(Res‖t)‖
SIGskatn(Res‖t)‖t}
(7)
• Step 3: If 51% ATNs approve, it means that the new
block is successfully created. RPN broadcasts the data
block together with ATNs’ public keys and signatures,
as shown in equation (8). All nodes on the consortium
blockchain must update their data. It takes 10s for each
RPN to create a block. A full cycle takes about 300s
(30 ∗ 10), about 5 minutes. At the end of each cycle, the
top 30 RPNs have to readjust once.
RPN → All : Dblock ={Dset‖Dhash‖pkatni‖
SIGskatni (Res‖t)‖t}
(8)
5) Data Sharing: For secure EMRs sharing, P pre-sets ac-
cess permissions in the smart contracts, such as access rights,
access actions (eg. read, write or copy), duration, etc. Once
meeting the access condition, the smart contract is triggered
automatically to execute the corresponding operation, which
can ensure the legality and fairness of data sharing. EMRs
sharing is completed by the following two parts:
a) Blockchain Access Authentication
• Step 1: Data Access Request: The data user U initi-
ates a EMRs sharing request transaction (Req) to the
blockchain network. The request should include infor-
mation such as the access target (ID), the access object
(obj) and access content. RPN receives the transaction
request and checks the identity of U . Only U is legal,
the transaction data will be recorded in the blockchain.
U → RPN : Req = (ID‖obj‖i‖t), i ∈ [1, 7] (9)
Annotation: Here i indicates the index of the medical
data content that the user U wants to access.
• Step 2: Smart Contract Execution: If Req meets access
conditions, the smart contract is triggered to decrypt the
indexes of EMRs with skpat and return the cipher-text
message of the indexes to U ; Otherwise, the sharing
request is denied.
Message = Epkuser (Indexi‖t) (10)
• Step 3: Data Storage Location Extraction: U decrypts the
cipher-text message and obtains Indexi that contains the
storage location urli.
b) Cloud Storage EMR Sharing
With urli, the user U can retrieve the data object in the
cloud, as shown in Algorithm 4.
Then, U should verify the signature δExt to ensure the
validity and integrity of M ′ through the following two steps:
Signature Verification:
- Verify if CEAS ⊂ CI(M ′). If it does, perform the
following step. Otherwise, it aborts.
Algorithm 4 Data Retrieval Process in CCAC
Input: The data storage location in the cloud, urli; User
private key, SK .
Output: Data object, Mi.
1: Retrieve Eki(Mi‖hi‖T ), E
′
A(ki) by urlsi;
2: if the attribute set S corresponding to SK does not satisfy
E′A(ki) implicit access control policy A then
3: return failure
4: end if
5: Run the Decrypt Algorithm of CP-ABE to decryptE′A(ki)
with SK and obtain ki;
6: Run the symmetric algorithm to decrypt Eki(Mi‖hi‖T )
with ki and obtain Mi;
- For each i ∈ CI(M ′), compute hi =
H(Mi‖CEAS‖T ‖i) and verify v
r · rδi = ghi(mod p)
holds or not.
If the extraction signature is correct, the user can perform
his/her access action. Otherwise, the user can inform the cloud
storage manager that the data might has been modified.
IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this part, we analyze the security of the proposed BPDS
in terms of tamper-proof, privacy preservation, data secure
storage and sharing.
A. Tamper-Proof
In BPDS, EMRs are immutable and cannot be modified
arbitrarily. Since each data block contains a current timestamp
and a hash of the previous block, chronologically nested
blocks guarantee transactions cannot be changed unless some-
one can take over 51% of the whole network computational
power simultaneously. Moreover, each access request and
access activity is recorded in the blockchain, any change to
the data can be audited and tracked. So, the proposed BPDS
can ensure tamper-proof property.
B. Privacy Preservation
As EMRs are highly sensitive private data of patients, they
do not want to be disclosed without permission. In BPDS, the
privacy property is ensured thanks to the following festures:
-- Anonymity. Each participant generates a unique account
with a random public key. Therefore, each transaction on
the blockchain is anonymous. In addition, users use different
public keys for different transactions, which makes multiple
transactions requested by the same user cannot be linked.
-- Cloud Storage. The original EMRs are encrypted and
stored in the cloud storage. In this way, not only the problem
of limited storage capacity of blockcahin is solved, but also
the risk of the original medical data leakage is greatly reduced.
-- Content Extraction Signature. The proposed scheme
employs CES scheme when the doctors sign the EMRs. The
patients can remove any sensitive portions in the original data
to obtain the valid extraction signatures with minimal risk
of data privacy leakage. Moreover, any entities cannot forge
extraction signatures without the signer’s private key.
-- Improved DPoS. BPDS uses the improved DPoS consen-
sus to realize the trust between a certain number of preselected
nodes in the consortium blockchain. In the improved DPoS,
the selected medical organizations are reputable and reliable,
which guarantees the reliability of data sharing.
C. Data Secure Storing and Sharing
The security of data storing and sharing is an important
feature of BPDS. In this scheme, patients can have complete
control over their own EMRs. The processes from data
acquiring to data sharing are all secure.
-- Data Acquiring. The use of symmetric encryption tech-
nology guarantees the confidentiality and integrity of EMRs
generated by doctors.
-- Data Storing. The patient encrypts the original EMRs
and stores them in the cloud. The use of the distributed storage
and CP-ABE-based access control scheme in cloud ensures
the security of the medical data.
-- Data Release. First, the indexes of EMRs are reserved
in a tamper-proof blockchain, which cannot be modified ar-
bitrarily. Second, blockchain is a distributed database without
single-point-of-failure and each node has a copy of transaction
records. Besides, the digital signature provides authentication,
integrity, and non-repudiation for each transaction.
-- Data Sharing. In BPDS, the data access permissions
are preset in the smart contracts. Only authorized users or
institutions can use the EMRs. The executed access records
are stored in the blockchain to trace the behaviours of data.
Once someone violates the access rules or permissions, the
data owner has the right to revoke his/her access permission.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, a blockchain-based privacy-preserving data
sharing system for EMRs is proposed, named BPDS. In
BPDS, EMRs are stored in the cloud and the indexes are
recorded in a tamper-proof consortium blockchain, which
solves the potential security risks of data centralized storage.
The joint-design of the CP-ABE-based access control mech-
anism and the content extraction signature scheme provides
strong privacy preservation in data sharing. Moreover, the use
of smart contracts for presetting access permissions ensures
data access securely. By implementing the proposed BPDS,
patients can have complete control over their own EMRs and
the users or institutions can use data conveniently without any
risk on patients’ privacy.
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